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Introduction
A derivative in its simplest terms is a contract between two parties about the value of an
underlying asset. The parties can initiate these contracts in two ways, on large, standardized
exchanges, or privately between two parties in the Over the Counter (OTC) market. Over the
Counter derivatives have been identified as a contributing factor to the financial crisis in 2008.
This is partially because the OTC derivatives market is exposed to a large amount of
counterparty risk, or the risk that the other party involved in the contract will default on
payment of the derivative contract. While counterparty risk in the OTC market might sound like
it is simply the same type of default risk in other financial markets, the concentration of
contracts around relatively few key financial institutions and size of the market make the
economy increasingly subject to the risk of a default in this market (Shinasi, 2001). Figure 1
below shows the BIS estimates of the recent value of OTC derivative contracts outstanding.
This value is more than 3 times the market value of US stock exchanges and is only slightly less
than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the world .
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Figure 1 Size of the OTC Derivative Market (BIS 2012)

A prime example of the significance of counterparty risk in the OTC market was
insurance giant American International Group (AIG), which, in 2008, had issued approximately
$527 billion notional value in credit default swap contracts and accumulated these obligations
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while only posting a small percentage of the expected payment obligation as collateral.
Because AIG posted little collateral per contract, it was able to issue contracts to such an extent
that when called to increase the amount of collateral posted due to a drop in its credit rating,
AIG teetered on the edge of bankruptcy until it was bailed out by the federal government in
September of 2008 (Sjostrum, 2009). If this would have been a small business filing for
bankruptcy and defaulting on obligations, there would be an economic loss to the stakeholders
in that business. However, considering that the counterparties to AIG’s credit default swaps are
some of the world’s largest financial institutions, such as Goldman Sachs and the Royal Bank of
Scotland (MacIntosh, 2009), AIG’s bankruptcy or default could cause a chain reaction of
financial distress that affects the availability of credit to individuals and business around the
world are able to receive (Shinasi, 2001).
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States passed the Dodd-Frank
Financial Reform Act of 2008, one of its most comprehensive acts of financial legislation in
history. Emphasizing the significance of OTC derivatives as a contributing factor to the crisis, a
key provision of the Dodd-Frank Act calls for increased restrictions on the OTC market.
Although the details are still in the process of being implemented, a process known as “clearing
derivatives” is present in Title VII of Dodd-Frank. Congress intended this provision to mitigate
counterparty risk. The new clearing requirements aim to accomplish this in several of ways;
requiring companies to post additional collateral, contribute to a default account, and settle the
gains and losses periodically, so losses cannot accumulate on credit (Ernst & Young LLP, 2013).
While improving the clearing process may be successful at mitigating counterparty risk,
it could also have unintended economic consequences. These additional requirements increase
2

the costs of engaging in OTC derivative contracts. Thus, the new clearing requirements could
reduce the extent to which firms use OTC derivatives to hedge against risk. Additionally, the
agencies implementing Dodd-Frank’s OTC derivative reforms are facing increased legal scrutiny
for failing to sufficiently demonstrate the economic consequences of these regulations (Scalia,
2012), which has created an audience interested in literature that studies the relationship
between derivatives and the economy. Currently, however, a majority of the literature has
been confined to studying the effects of OTC derivative regulations on individual firms and not
on its effects on the economy as a whole (Gerding, 2011).
This paper attempts to address the missing macroeconomic aspect to OTC derivative
clearing literature and proceeds by providing a framework for analyzing the effects of reduced
derivative hedging activity on the sensitivity of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to shocks, or
unexpected changes in macroeconomic variables. This paper draws on literature regarding the
transmission of monetary policy to show how the initial shock to a given economic variable
affects other variables and eventually affects components of GDP, consumer spending,
investment spending, government spending, and net exports. This paper begins by providing a
brief overview of OTC derivative contracts, and it then provides an analysis of why clearing
requirements can be expected to reduce the extent to which firms use derivatives to hedge; the
paper examines four transmission channels individually, the credit channel, exchange rate
channel, equity price channel, and the money multiplier, and explains how a reduction in
hedging activity may change the sensitivity of GDP to an economic shock. Finally, this paper
provides suggestions for further research on the topic.
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Overview of Derivatives
To understand the importance of clearing, it is helpful to understand the basic function
of derivatives and the mechanics of their trading. At a basic level, a derivative is a contract in
which two parties agree to fulfill an obligation in the future with respect to the condition of
some underlying asset, and the value of the contract, or its market price, fluctuates according
to the structure of the underlying asset (Gharagozlou, 2011).
One of the simplest OTC derivatives is a foreign currency forward. These contracts are
used to hedge against a change in exchange rates that could alter the value of a company’s cash
flows denominated in another currency. The value of the forward contract depends on the
value of these cash collections, which varies based on the exchange rate: as the value of the US
dollar declines relative to the foreign currency, the contract becomes less valuable to the party
buying it because the company could have exchanged its cash collections at a more favorable
rate without the contract. The benefit to the company is the ability to lock in the exchange rate
and reduce uncertainty about the value of its cash collections in the future by making the
exchange rate risk itself tradable (Papaioannou, 2006). Forward contracts allow companies to
more reliably forecast their earnings, making them very popular; it is estimated that 92% of
Fortune 500 companies manage price risks using derivatives (Deutsche Boerse AG, 2008).
Another type of derivative contract is an option contract. In an option contract, the
buyer of the contract has the right to buy or sell that asset at a specific time for a specific price.
With a forward contract, both parties remain exposed to both unlimited risk of the underlying
asset increasing and decreasing in price because they have the obligation to fulfill the terms of
the contract. An option, on the other hand, provides the buyer simply with the right, not the
4

obligation, to buy or sell the asset. This protects the buyer insofar as the maximum amount of
downside risk is simply the fee associated with buying the option (Gharagozlou, 2011).
Another type of derivative contract is a credit default swap (CDS), which can be used to
hedge against the risk of a change in creditworthiness of an underlying asset. For example,
many large financial firms sought such protection from various assets using Credit Default
Swaps (CDSs) issued by AIG, in which AIG promised to pay investors in the event that the credit
status of one of their assets changed (Deutsche Boerse AG, 2008).
An important distinction among different types of derivatives is how they are originated
and traded. Exchange traded derivatives are fully standardized, which means that the terms of
the contracts are set by the exchange on which they are traded, and the contracts do not vary
among different parties. OTC derivatives are directly negotiated between two parties without
the presence of an exchange. These contracts have custom terms that differ significantly from
commonly observable contracts. They are typically less liquid, meaning easily convertible to
cash without significantly altering the price, because there is no large market where investors
can observe their price and terms. This makes these contracts hard to price and sell, though it
should be noted that most OTC derivatives are fairly standard and not subject to much liquidity
risk (Deutsche Boerse AG, 2008).
The distinction between exchange-traded derivatives and OTC derivatives is important
because we can expect clearing requirements to have different effects in the different markets
based on their characteristics. The next section will expand on the likely implementation of
OTC derivative clearing requirements in Dodd-Frank and analyze potential consequences for
the OTC market.
5

OTC Derivatives and Clearing Requirements
Dodd-Frank contains a provision to enforce clearing in the OTC market in the same way
as it is currently enforced in the exchange traded derivatives market. To accomplish this, a
clearinghouse would act as the counterparty to both sides of the contract. The clearinghouse
would require a number of additional steps to engage in a contract. Figure 1 below provides an
outline of the proposed process (Russo, Hart, & Shoenenberger, 2002).

Figure 2: OTC Derivative Clearing Process (Sidney Austin, LLP, 2011)

Figure 1 shows how the formerly privately negotiated contracts would go through the
clearing process. The end-user, the buyer of the contract, and the trade counterparty, the
seller, both submit the contract to a central clearing party for approval before the trade is
executed. The logistics of this process are intended to mitigate counterparty risk in several
ways. First, this contractual agreement requires each party to post collateral in a settlement
account at the clearinghouse. The role of this collateral is to make the agreement more secure,
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requiring each firm to place a certain percentage of the expected payment on the contract in an
account at the clearinghouse helps ensure payment (Pirrong, 2009).
Parties are generally only required to post a portion of the settlement amount as
collateral, but the clearinghouse re-computes the collateral requirements multiple times per
day based on the current settlement amount of the contract. If a party is unable to meet the
requirements of the contract, it is considered in default and its settlement account is cleared to
ensure that the clearinghouse can party in the transaction. This feature helps to prevent the
losses on contracts from accumulating and reduce the risk that the counterparty will not have
capital available to make the expected payment. A second feature of the legislation requires
the counterparties to post additional capital to a common default account. The clearinghouse
can draw down this account to pay a counterparty in the case of a default. This adds a second
layer of security to the clearinghouse (Pirrong, 2011).
While these new requirements may reduce counterparty risk, they also could reduce the
optimal amount of hedging that firms engage in for several reasons. First, since firms are
required to post a margin for the hedging contracts, it reduces the extent to which the firms’
limited capital can be used to back derivative contracts. The clearinghouse has to maintain a
default fund from which it will draw funds to compensate parties in the case of a default when
the posted margin is not sufficient to cover the contract. The contribution to the default fund is
usually based on the size of the individual margin account, which increases as the value of the
contracts increase. Thus, as the amount of cash flow a firm needs to hedge increases, the more
the firms must contribute to its clearinghouse default fund (Pirrong, 2009).
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A third reason that clearing requirements would reduce the amount of hedging taking
place is because the clearinghouse can refuse to clear certain contracts. Since clearinghouses
would be exposed to default risk due to these new regulations, they may refuse to clear certain
contracts that expose them to significant risk. If there is not a sufficient number of parties
willing to take the opposite side of a transaction, the clearinghouse could be exposed to risk
because if one side defaults, the clearinghouse would be responsible for compensating the
other side, even if the payment on the contract continues to increase. Since OTC derivative
contracts are highly customizable, it may be difficult for a clearinghouse to find a sufficient
number of parties that take the opposite bet and would, accordingly, refuse to clear some of
these contracts (Gharagozlou, 2011).
Although the new clearing requirements in Dodd-Frank could reduce counterparty risk,
they may also lead firms to use derivative contracts less. Less hedging may mean less
counterparty risk, but, as I argue below, it also has the potential to increase GDP volatility. The
next several sections attempt to address this concern by providing a framework for analyzing
the effects of a reduction in hedging on GDP variability similar to the channels through which
shocks are transmitted. This can focus studies on a more narrowly defined set of questions
about the effect of hedging on each channel. These channels include the credit channel, the
exchange rate channel, the equity price channel, and the money multiplier. In each case, an
economic shock would send output up or down is affected by the level of hedging undertaken
by firms.

8

Hedging and the Credit Channel
The first channel through which shocks may be transmitted is the credit channel. This
channel works through two effects, the cost of capital effect and a magnifying effect. Firms’
hedging behavior influences of these mechanisms. Figure 3 below shows the steps in the cost
of capital effect and how an interest rate shock can eventually affect the investment spending
component of GDP (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995).

Interest Rates

Firm's Cost of
Capital

Investment

GDP

Figure 3 - The Cost of Capital Effect (Mishkin, 1996)

The cost of capital effect explains how an interest rate shock can alter the investment
decisions of firms by changing their cost of capital. The general level of interest rates affects
firms’ cost of capital by changing a firm’s cost of debt and cost of equity. A firm’s cost of capital
is a factor that determines whether or not a potential investment project can be expected to
increase the value of the firm; thus, it influences the amount of projects in which firms are
willing to invest. If an interest rate shock increases the cost of capital, we expect firms to
engage in less investment spending because the funds are more expensive, and potential
projects have to earn a higher return to provide potential investors in the company with the
rate of return that they require. Similarly, if an interest rate shock decreases the cost of capital,
we can expect investment spending to rise because the funds used to invest are cheaper and
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projects that earn a lesser return can still be attractive because they earn a higher rate of return
than investors require (Fender, 2000).
Fender (2000) argues that asymmetric information in the credit markets can magnify the
cost of capital effect, and he also argues that firms can mitigate this magnification by hedging
their cash flows against the change in interest rates. To see this, it is useful to consider
Fender’s model. Fender assumes that a firm’s cash flow is inversely related to the market
interest rate. Without derivatives to hedge against the risk of interest rates rising, an
unexpected increase in interest rates would cause the firm’s cash flows to decrease (Fender,
2000).
Fender introduces asymmetric information in credit markets into the model by
assuming the lender cannot observe the extent to which inputs are used in the production
process. The firm, therefore, knows significantly more about whether or not it is going to be
able to generate sufficient cash flows to pay interest on the loan, which imposes agency costs
on the lender. To compensate for this uncertainty associated with the lending process, lenders
typically charge higher rates of interest, which drives a wedge between the cost of internal
funds and external funds (Fender, 2000).
Even if it were possible for lenders to observe different resource allocations and other
information about the firm’s cash flows, there would be transaction costs associated with this
monitoring, which also results in a higher cost of external financing. The firm’s investment
decision is, thus, sensitive to the extent to which it has to rely on external financing, which is
dependent on the level of internal cash flow, which is dependent on the general level of
interest rates. Since an increase in the general level of interest rates, the firm’s level of
10

investment spending would decline not only because its cost of capital increased, but also
because its reliance on external funds increased (Fender, 2000). Figure 4 provides a visual
representation of the variables through which this channel operates.

Interest Rates

Firm’s Cash
Flow

Agency Costs
of Borrowing

Investment

GDP

Figure 4: The Financial Accelerator (Mishkin, 1996)

Fender argues, however, that a firm can more accurately predict the amount internal
funds it will have to spend on investment projects. Hedging would allow the firm to reduce the
uncertainty associated with its cash flows, enabling the firm to predict a constant level of
external funds required to finance projects, which, in turn, enables the firm to reduce the cost
of financing these projects and insulates its investment spending from the interest rate shock
(Fender, 2000).
Fender (2000) argues that the presence of hedging with derivative contracts in this
model reduces the credit channel to just the cost of capital effect. This is because when the
firm facing interest rate risk can stabilize its cash flows in a given period, it is able to predict its
reliance on external funding and make its decisions based on the expected cash flow, which will
happen entirely independently of the movement of interest rates. Without the financial
accelerator magnifying the change in the firm’s investment decision with respect to the initial
change in interest rates, the investment spending component of GDP should be less sensitive to
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changes in interest rates with hedging. Accordingly, reduction in hedging behavior should
increase the effect of the financial accelerator and magnify the change in investment spending
as a result of interest rate changes. This makes the investment spending component of GDP
more sensitive to the initial interest rate shock, which could magnify the amount of systematic
risk in the economy. If the economy experiences a negative interest rate shock, the resulting
decrease in GDP could be more drastic in a world in which the Dodd-Frank clearing provision
causes firms to hedge less.

Hedging and the Exchange Rate Channel
A second path through which shocks may be transmitted to the economy is the
exchange rate channel. Hedging can be used in the same way as in the credit channel to reduce
the final change in GDP components in response to an initial shock. Figure 5 below outlines the
steps in the exchange rate channel.

Exchange
Rates

Net
Exports

GDP

Figure 5: The Exchange Rate Channel (Mishkin, 1996)

As Figure 5 outlines, this channel functions via the relationship between exchange rates
and net exports: an increase in demand for the dollar causes an appreciation of the dollar
relative to foreign currencies. This makes foreign goods cheaper relative to domestic goods.
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Accordingly, the net exports portion of GDP can decrease when exchange rates increase
(Mishkin, 1996).
Firms can use forward contracts to hedge against a change in the exchange rate. The
forward contract can be used to lock in the price of a good that firms have to purchase in
another currency by agreeing to exchange currency in the future at the forward rate with a
counterparty. Accordingly, exchange rates can vary significantly between the time when firms
purchase forward contracts and the time when they purchase assets denominated in the
foreign currency without it changing the firms’ purchasing decisions (Deutsche Boerse AG,
2008).
Because clearing can make using these contracts more expensive, it can reduce the
extent to which firms can use these contracts to hedge against change in the exchange rate.
This increases the variability of the prices of foreign goods relative to domestic goods and
could, accordingly, increase the variability of the net exports portion of GDP.

Hedging and the Equity Price Channel
A third channel through which shocks are transmitted is the equity price channel. This
channel works through two mechanisms, Tobin’s q, and the wealth effect. Tobin’s q measures
the market value of the firm relative to the replacement cost of its capital (Mishkin, 1996).
When the q ratio is high, a firm can replace its capital relatively cheaply and will, accordingly,
engage in investment spending. On the other hand, when q is low, this means that either the
market value of firms is low or replacement cost of capital is high, and in either case, it is likely
that a firm could maximize its wealth by acquiring a company at lower market values and
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acquire its used assets rather than replacing the assets at a high replacement cost. Figure 6
provides a visual illustration of Tobin’s q (Mishkin, 1996).

Equity
Prices

q
•𝑞=

𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

Investment
Spending

GDP

Consumption

GDP

Figure 6: Tobin's q (Mishkin, 1996)

Equity Prices

Wealth

Figure 7: The Wealth Effect (Mishkin, 1996)

Figure 7 outlines the second mechanism whereby shocks are transmitted through the
equity price channel, known as the wealth effect. Since both companies and individuals hold a
significant amount of investment held in stocks, the price movements of these assets affect the
extent to which companies and individuals feel wealthy, which alters their spending decisions.
For example, when equity prices decrease, and reduce the value of individual retirement
portfolios, the effected individuals typically do not feel as wealthy as they did previously,
leading to a decrease in their consumption spending. Even though equity prices could then
increase again, restoring the portfolio to its former wealth, in the meantime individual
consumption decisions will be partially driven by this perceived lack of wealth (Mishkin, 1996).
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Firms and individuals can use derivatives to hedge against changes in their net worth as
a result of equity price changes in a number of ways that will make their individual investment
and discretionary spending decisions less sensitive to equity prices. First, the firm can purchase
derivative contracts, the value of which changes according to the general level of equity prices
in the market depending on individual firm exposure. This would make the firm’s spending and
investment decisions less sensitive to changes in equity prices because its cash flows would
change in proportion to the change in equity prices, which can serve to balance the increase or
decrease in equity prices (Mishkin, 1996).
For example, if a firm’s equity investment decreased in value, but its derivative hedge
increased in value proportionally, there would be no change in net worth resulting from the
change in equity prices, which would cause the firm to feel no wealthier and not change its
spending decisions. Even if the firm was not entirely hedged against movements in equity
prices, the presence of a hedge means that the net worth of the firm would be less sensitive to
a movement in equity prices than it would absent the hedge, which should still result in less
sensitivity of the firm’s investment spending to the change in equity prices.
Hedging with derivatives can also make spending decisions less sensitive to changes in
equity prices via the Tobin’s q mechanism. Purchasing real options would allow a firm to keep
its replacement cost of capital relatively low because it allows the firm to lock in the price of
purchasing an asset for a period of time. In periods of rising prices, which is fairly common, the
use of real options would tend to push q higher than it would otherwise be, suggesting that
equity prices would have to decrease to a larger extent in order to provide incentives to forego
investment spending in replacement capital and purchase another company instead. Further,
15

high acquisition costs, combined with the use of real options to decrease costs associated with
investing in replacement capital, makes this case even more convincing because it adds a
significant amount of cost and complexity to purchasing another firm to acquire capital, making
it more likely that the firm would simply purchase replacement capital (Mishkin, 1996).
Through both Tobin’s q and the wealth effect, hedging is able to make the investment
spending component of GDP less sensitive to equity price shocks. Accordingly, if clearing
requirements reduced the extent to which firms hedged against the risk of equity price
changes, GDP could become more sensitive to equity price shocks, which could amplify the
normal fluctuations in the business cycle.

Hedging, the Money Multiplier, and Leverage
The last channel this paper will discuss is known as the money multiplier. Like the credit
channel, it functions based on the extension of credit to individuals and institutions, but rather
than changing the amount of investment spending through changing the cost of capital, this
channel considers the change in the amount of credit that institutions are able to extend based
on the amount of saving in the economy. Since financial institutions are only required to post a
small amount of capital to cover the expected payment on contracts, they are able to use a
finite amount of capital to finance a greater amount of credit extended. This leveraged
condition creates a situation where a change in the amount of savings by individuals and
corporations causes a greater change in the amount of credit extended to business (Gerding,
2011).
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Current macroeconomic research (Gerding, 2011) suggests that the leverage created by
derivatives functions very similarly to the traditional money multiplier effect and is another
channel through which savings shocks are transmitted throughout the economy. Capital
requirements are analogous to the reserve ratio in this case; the institution writing the
derivative contract can be required to set aside capital on reserve to cover the expected
payment on the contract but is not required to set the entire amount of the expected payment
aside, which creates a similar situation to the required reserve ratio.
This is important because clearing requirements can be expected to increase the capital
requirements on contracts. In this case, clearing can reduce the amount of derivative contracts
that can be financed with a finite amount of capital to back them. If the amount of contracts is
reduced, this could reduce the multiplier’s magnification of an initial savings shock. Figure 8
below provides a visual representation of how the transfer of this process through the use of
credit default swaps, denoted as CDS in Figure 8. While the example considers the transfer of
credit risk using asset-backed securities, this is only one example of a means through which
leveraged derivatives can increase the amount of credit extended to borrowers (Gerding, 2011).

17
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Figure 8: Derivatives and Leverage (Gerding, 2011)

The example in Figure 8 assumes that loan borrowers seek credit extended from an
investment vehicle. In the first step of this process, the investment vehicle provides cash on
credit to the loan borrowers who provide the investment vehicle with a promise to repay,
creating the risk that the borrowers will be unable to repay the loan, referred to as credit risk.
In the second step, the investment vehicle seeks to transfer this risk to investors using assetbacked securities, or securities that derive their value from the cash flows associated with
various groups of the original loans. The investors provide the investment vehicle with the cash
used to purchase the asset backed securities, and the investment vehicle promises to pay the
investor a series of cash flows from the loans, which transfers a portion of the credit risk to
individual investors.
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The example in Figure 8 then assumes that the individual investors who purchase the
asset-backed securities are also concerned about the credit risk they are assuming and want
protection against the potential default of one or more of the original loan borrowers. To
mitigate this risk, investors can use a credit default swap, which transfers the credit risk to the
first swap provider. This process continues, creating a chain of credit default swaps that aim to
transfer the original credit risk to second and third swap providers (Gerding, 2011).
So far we have been working through this model from left to right, demonstrating how
the investment vehicle and other investors are able to distribute the credit risk created by the
loans. If Figure 8 is examined from right to left, it demonstrates how capital requirements can
magnify the amount of credit extended to borrowers resulting from a change in savings. If the
swap providers are required to keep less capital on reserve to cover the expected payment to
the investors, more capital is freed to back the issuance of additional credit default swaps. If
the amount of available credit default swaps to provide insurance against loan defaults
increases, investors will increase their demand for these securities because they can pass along
some of the credit risk to the credit default swap providers (Gerding, 2011).
Further, if investors demand more asset-backed securities, the investment vehicle will
have an incentive and ability to grant more credit to loan borrowers and package these new
loans into asset-backed securities. Accordingly, if capital requirements are reduced, the
amount of credit extended by the investment vehicle is increased, and if capital requirements
are increased, the amount of credit extended by the investment vehicle is decreased (Gerding,
2011).
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Shocks are transmitted through this channel and eventually magnified by the multiplier
effect through the link between these institutions and capital markets. Much like in the bank
example, we assume that an exogenous shock causes individuals to change their savings
preferences, either increasing or decreasing their desire to save, but unlike the previous
example, we now assume that they save some of this in capital markets to earn a return rather
than keeping it in demand deposits at a bank. This increases the demand for instruments that
the swap providers can use to finance their contracts, which reduces the borrowing rate of the
swap providers.
Accordingly, the swap providers can finance more swaps, which provide more insurance
to investors, who then increase their demand for asset-backed securities, which expands the
amount of credit extended to the original loan borrowers. The new credit extended to loan
borrowers is in excess of the amount saved in debt because each dollar saved can be used to
finance more than one additional dollar of new credit default swaps due to the capital
requirements discussed in the previous paragraph, creating the same multiplier effect (Gerding,
2011).
The requirement that OTC derivatives be cleared first amounts to increasing capital
requirements, an intentional feature designed to mitigate counterparty risk, which also causes
the amount of additional credit extended to the loan borrowers to be less sensitive to
unexpected changes in savings preferences. Capital requirements would necessarily be
increased by the clearinghouse because it requires that both parties post collateral in a margin
account to cover a certain percentage of the expected payment on the contract, but it also
requires that the parties contribute to an account that can be pooled with all other parties that
20

deal with the clearinghouse to cover the losses associated with a default. Since it is likely that
these capital requirements would be in excess of what most firms currently post, as it would
not otherwise be an effective means of mitigating counterparty risk, requiring OTC derivatives
to be cleared would effectively increase capital requirements (Ernst & Young LLP, 2013).
In Figure 8, raising capital requirements reduces the extent to which firms can free up
capital to support additional derivative contracts, such as credit default swaps, which should
reduce the multiplier effect. Accordingly, clearing in this sense could actually have the opposite
effect on this channel as it has on some of the others: clearing could make movements in the
economy less sensitive to savings shocks because the system is less leveraged.

Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research
Although clearing requirements may reduce counterparty risk and make the economy
less vulnerable to the default of a large lender, it also has important unintended
macroeconomic consequences. Because clearing increases transactions costs associated with
hedging activity, we can expect clearing to reduce the total amount of hedging occurring in the
economy. This paper attempts to uncover some of the relationships between this reduction in
hedging and the transmission of shocks throughout the economy and found that hedging can
affect a number of channels through which these shocks are transmitted.
We can theoretically expect a reduction in the total amount of hedging to reduce the
insulation of GDP from unanticipated changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and equity
prices, but increase the insulation of GDP from unanticipated changes in savings preferences
through the money multiplier. It is important to note, however, that the increased insulation
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against changes in savings preferences is because increased capital requirements lead to a
reduction in the amount of credit extended to borrowers, which could negatively affect the
investment spending component of GDP and counteract some of this increased insulation.
The next step in studying the existence of this effect is quantitative analysis. In order to
quantitatively demonstrate these effects, both the relationship between clearing requirements
and hedging, and the relationship between hedging and the elasticity of GDP components
relative to shocks should be analyzed. Based on the findings of this paper, the relationship
between clearing and hedging should be negative, and the reduction in hedging can be
expected to correlate with a higher elasticity of GDP to shocks in the first three channels and a
lower elasticity of GDP to shocks in the last channel.
First, the levels of OTC derivative trading before and after clearing would have to be
analyzed to determine if there is a decrease in trading. This could be analyzed by looking to
international derivative markets with different clearing rand capital requirements. In
international markets, the volume of OTC derivatives being traded could be examined relative
to clearing and capital requirements to see if there is a relationship. Also the derivative
disclosures in publically traded firms’ annual report could be examined, as they typically reveal
the extent to which the firm is hedged against changes in various risk factors, such as
macroeconomic variables.
The relationship between the level of hedging and the variability of GDP components
can be analyzed in several ways. Models, such as the one presented in Fender (2000), can be
extended to other channels to support a hypothesis to test in each. The hypotheses will be an
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expected relationship between either the volume of OTC derivatives being traded or the extent
of firms’ hedging positions and the components of GDP.
The discussion surrounding Dodd-Frank and the implementation of OTC derivative
clearing requirements is leading to a burgeoning body of literature on potential economic
consequences. Regulators can use this discussion as a whole to understand some of the
unintended consequences of their legislation, and this paper attempts to provide the
connection that will hopefully serve as the impetus for future statistical analysis on the topic to
eventually determine if regulators should be concerned with the effects of clearing
requirements on the transmission of shocks throughout the economy.
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